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How to think responsibly about the climate crisis, via precautionary 
reasoning:  
A case-study in overcoming scientism, after Wittgenstein 
 
 
 
 By Rupert Read. 
 
 
(Summary) 
I argue that a properly ‘precautionary’ approach to serious and scalable i 
threats -- that is, to threats whose downside could be indefinitely bad -- escapes the 
criticisms normally made of it.  
Such an approach, in the case of such threats, is frequently (1) necessary, 
rather than being a second-best to the attainment of ‘full scientific confidence’. I lean 
on Wittgenstein’s On Certainty (henceforth OC), to help show this. 
Moreover, even in cases where one might in principle be disappointed not to 
have attained scientific confidence, then, perhaps surprisingly, and certainly crucially, 
a properly precautious approach makes strong action to pre-empt such threats (2) 
more urgent and important than in cases where such certainty has been attained  
(Because, in cases where full scientific confidence has been attained, then risk can be 
calculated, but cases of incalculable risks are always potentially at least as harmful if 
not more harmful; for, ex hypothesi, one then doesn’t know just how bad the harm 
will get.ii).  
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I defend my argument — again drawing on Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, and 
also on Nassim Taleb’s important work on risk and uncertainty — from the possible 
objection against it that the Precautionary Principle would immobilise one, through 
having to consider any (‘logically’) ‘possible’ threat, however crazy. In fact, I show 
how a properly precautionary approach (3) does not expose one to mad threats.iii 
Finally, the Precautionary Principle, by calling upon us to act so as to reduce 
manufactured, avoidable uncertainty, can be in part powerfully expressed as a 
genuinely iv ‘second-order’ or ‘meta’ Precautionary Principle: (4) We ought to act so 
as to (aim to) reduce our future exposure to (situations of dangerous) uncertainty, i.e. 
To reduce our exposure to situations in which we are forced to invoke and apply the 
Precautionary Principle to uncertain severe harms. I point here to the need to reduce 
our vulnerabilities to future potentially-catastrophic uncertainties – this implies 
accepting the inevitable presence of some uncertainties/ignorancesv (and accepting 
their presence implies allowing ourselves to be vulnerable in some ways to them) and 
building this into our models of socio-economic organisation such that we can cope 
and indeed even thrive when things go wrong, and reducing the (e.g. ecological) 
stakes, in terms of what kinds of things can go wrong and how wrong they can go. 
Thus the Principle, properly applied, will in the long-term, as one might put it, to 
some extent benignly ‘self-deconstruct’, or gradually ‘wither away’. For the more it is 
applied aright, the less avoidable exposure to uncertainty (of the kind bringing in its 
train serious and non-calculable threats) we will collectively face. 
Thus, overall, my argument is that precaution is an alternative to scientism, in 
particular to the crude and now extremely widespread scientism embodied in the 
fetish now made of ‘evidence-based’ approaches that ignore precautionary and ethical 
considerations. It is in this key sense an eminently Wittgensteinian enterprise. 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
(0: Introduction)  
Scientism is perhaps the dominant ideology of our time.vi It is so dominant, at 
least in most intellectual circles, that it is hard to see it at all. It is rather the sea we 
swim in. It is so hegemonic that it fails even to register as a belief, as an ideology, as 
having live-option alternatives. 
The dominance of this ideology registers in the extent to which scientism’s 
greatest foe, Wittgenstein, is marginalised in our culture in general and in philosophy 
in particular. It registers also in the extent to which it appears self-evident to most 
people in our culture that being ‘evidence-based’ is an unalloyed good. Of course, 
being ‘evidence-based’ is indeed good, if the alternative is engaging in wishful 
thinking, medicine or government by anecdote, or superstition. But it is not 
necessarily good as opposed to being grounded in ethics. Or in precaution. (Can we 
imagine precaution without evidence for precaution? In some cases, yes: we simply 
practice a via negativa. We avoid or prevent engendering new forms of potential 
pollution, for instance, without requiring any evidence at all that such pollution is 
actually harmful. I return to this point in section (4), below.) 
Moreover, much of what is called ‘evidence’ simply isn’t. For it is not 
statistically significant, relevant to the long timescales in which ‘black swan’ events 
may occur…and when they occur they are not untypically ‘dominant’: they matter 
more than everything else combined, both because of their sheer magnitude, and 
because they are far more likely to be irrevocable / to create new and potentially 
devastating path-dependencies. Thus it is too easy for being ‘evidence-based’ to 
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amount to a very narrow and short-termist view, ignoring the rare, ignoring the 
dominant catastrophic occurrence; ignoring (in short) our ignorance. 
This is the possibility that I explore in the current essay… That a 
precautionary ethic is a possible and indeed a necessary alternative to the dogmas of 
contemporary scientism. That it steps outside the harmful confines of the mantra of 
being ‘evidence-based’ that is merely the latest cloak for a dangerous scientism. And 
that it can find a kind of philosophical support in the work of Wittgenstein and in his 
profound opposition to scientism. 
 Of course, there is absolutely nothing wrong with science as such. I am a 
(Wittgensteinian, Kuhnian) philosopher of science, and like virtually everyone in our 
culture I praise and admire its special achievements. The problem is when science is 
taken to be the only game in town. And/or when it is supposed to be unchallengeable. 
And/or when its products (e.g. technologies) are supposed to inherit its epistemic 
strengths and its ‘neutral’ status.  
 Picking up the last point there: Tacitly (or sometimes even explicitly), the 
legion advocates of scientism today suppose that there ought to be a default 
assumption not just in favour of (genuine) science but also in favour of the adoption 
of any new technology (or in favour of following up “curiosity” about anything that 
has been cultivated in any context; or of seeking a technologically “sweet” solution of 
any kind to any problem…). This is a presumption that I find hubristic and dangerous. 
This default assumption has been exposed by Heidegger,vii as well as by 
Wittgenstein.viii Our society operates on the basis of a problematic default assumption 
in favour of (technological) ‘progress’.ix 
 Overcoming this myth of progress involves overcoming the extreme 
‘Prometheanism’ and the lack of precaution x endemic to our current technocracy. We 
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are held captive xi by a myth of progress, so long as we do not step outside the 
assumption that there ought to be a default assumption in favour of the adoption of 
new forms of engineering. 
 In what follows, I expound the precautionary alternative to such reckless 
scientism. 
 
 
(1)  
Here is perhaps the most-widely-accepted public-policy-relevant version of 
the precautionary principle, from the 1990 ‘Bergen Declaration’, made by Ministers at 
the UN Economic Commission for Europe: 
 
“In order to achieve sustainable development, policies must be based on the 
precautionary principle. Environmental measures must anticipate, prevent and attack 
the causes of environmental degradation. Where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for 
postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation.” xii 
 
Thus the Principle applies pre-eminently to situations in which cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA) is inadequate because there can be no strictly probabilistic calculation of risks, 
because there is not scientific ‘certainty’ (and in fact, even where such ‘certainty’ 
exists, there will still always be contradictions with CBA, as Larry Lohmann’s work 
teaches us).xiii The relevant situations furthermore are situations where the potential 
‘downside’ is severe. 
The Precautionary Principle has been exposed to sustained attack by philosophers 
and others, xiv as well as by political opponents of precautious action in diverse fields 
(most notably, so-called ‘climate-sceptics’). I mean in this paper to defend (a 
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defensible version of) it. I start doing so by means of a discussion of the subtleties of 
the invocation of “lack of full scientific certainty”, in the (above-quoted formulation 
of the) Principle. 
The lack of “full scientific certainty” in such situations as are alluded to in the 
famous quotation above sounds as if it is something to be regretted. There is already 
something awry in this would-be regret, in that it neglects the extent to which science, 
if it is live science (with a research-frontier) by definition lacks certainty in some 
respects.xv …But, even bracketing that point, there is something deeper awry with the 
wish always to rely on science if possible.  
What I have just said might sound strange. For philosophers today, along with 
Western culture more generally, often think of science as the always-desirable first 
port of call, as the preferred mode of knowledge or inquiry,xvi compared to which 
other modes are always at best a regrettable default. But, as already implied in (0) 
above, this is wrong, for multiple reasons, two of which I dwell on and explicate here: 
i) There are forms of inquiry and knowledge-generation that are not even in 
principle amenable to scientisation: for instance, I would argue (and have 
argued), virtually all of economics and ‘social science’ more generally.xvii 
For to treat the objects of such inquiries as objects is to fail to appreciate 
their capacity to ‘answer back’: It is to fail to appreciate for instance that 
making an economic forecast (let alone acting on it) can end up being self-
fulfilling, or self-defeating (And one cannot know for sure which (or 
neither) of these two possibilities will eventuate, in advance); or that e.g. a 
monetary policy that relies on the best-extant theory of money can be 
deliberately bypassed by some societal members/forces seizing on 
something else to use as money. It is to fail to appreciate that the human 
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future cannot in principle be predicted by a human ‘observer’ (the scare-
quotes here are essential, which tells us a great deal), as any such prediction 
would/does alter the very future it aims to predict. It is to fail to reckon with 
human creativity (it is conceptually impossible to predict the results of 
future creativity, because to do so would be already to have achieved that 
creativity). It is to fail to understand what Winch (following Wittgenstein) 
has taught us: that there is no understanding of human affairs without an 
understanding of the human beings who make those affairs happen as 
subjects who themselves understand themselves as acting in particular 
ways. And it is to fail to understand the ubiquity of ‘Black Swan’ xviii events 
in largely determining human affairs.  
The types of ‘uncertainty’ being described and alluded to here are radically 
different from the uncertainty found in stochastic physical systems, (or) famously 
in quantum physics. They are sui generis, and utterly resistant to a programmatic 
scientisation -- as economists, sociologists, futurologists etc. have found out again 
and again, to their cost. 
Thus point (i) here places an insuperable limit on any programme of social or 
human science. And suggests instead the need for humility, for humanistic 
(including sometimes historical) understanding, for cultural immersion, etc., if we 
want to understand how people and societies may put themselves collectively at 
catastrophic risk, or counter such potential risks. 
 
ii) There are forms of knowledge xix that are too basic to be scientific. 
 I shall very briefly argue for this point using some of Wittgenstein’s On 
Certainty (OC). 
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 On Certainty, the writings of Wittgenstein’s final years, has not previously 
been applied to thinking about the Precautionary Principle (henceforth, ‘the PP’). But 
it is easy to do so. Let us consider this remark, penned by Wittgenstein just days 
before death took him: 
 
“If someone believes that he has flown from America to England in the last few days, 
then, I believe, he cannot be making a mistake. // And just the same if someone says 
that he is at this moment sitting at a table and writing.” xx 
 
For it would be as it were too ‘big’ to be a mistake. If such a person turned out, 
apparently, to be speaking in contravention to the facts of the matter, and if they 
sincerely believed what they themselves were saying, then we might speak instead, of 
(say) a “mental disturbance”.xxi 
 In On Certainty, Wittgenstein investigates the fundamental structure of our 
knowledge, the relationship we actually have to propositions such as “I have two 
hands”, or “The Earth has existed for more than fifty years”. He argues that it is a 
complete misunderstanding of this kind of basic knowledge (if it is to be called 
“knowledge” at all), to think of it as being itself provable, or establishable, in any 
way. In particular, the idea that we could scientifically validate such knowledge is 
quite simply absurd. For any effort that we made to verify or indeed to disprove such 
knowledge would itself take exactly such knowledge for granted, in the process.xxii 
 Such ‘basic knowledge’ xxiii cannot be meaningfully contravened. But neither 
can it be meaningfully undergirded or confirmed. (We might even consider the PP 
itself as an instance of such a fundamental mode of our knowing. I return to this 
possibility later, in section (4).) 
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‘The climate system’ in terms of our understanding of it as an actual system is partly 
constituted by type (i) knowledge, above. For example, there are limits to our 
knowledge about the prospects for our planetary climate because that climate is partly 
determined by human action that is subject to the ‘constraint’ on knowledge described 
under (i), above.xxiv  
Meanwhile, as I shall show in section (3), below, type (ii) knowledge as 
explicated by Wittgenstein can be invoked to undermine the argument (frequently 
used against the Precautionary Principle) that that Principle founders on an alleged 
need to consider all threats, however outlandish, and approach them all equally 
precautionarily. On the contrary: there are many things that necessarily have to be 
(and thus are) taken for granted in order for there to be any science, and (more 
broadly) any knowledge or inquiry (including for instance Precautionary inquiry), at 
all. 
 
Thus what I have established here in section (1) is that there is a swathe of crucial 
cases where taking a precautionary approach is not just a second-best to some hoped-
for scientific certainty, but is rather a constitutively necessary alternative to a 
‘scientistic’ approach, an approach that argues that the so-called ‘scientific method’ 
has to be applied to every problem.xxv Everywhere, in fact, outside the extremely rare 
cases of human practice where calculability is possible (e.g. the odds in a casino), and 
outside the kinds of cases where physical scientific knowledge is feasibly more or less 
completeable (on which, see section (2), below), we are in a realm where, strictly 
speaking, there are no strict (objective) probabilities, and so where a precautionary 
approach may be called for. Now: Where we are exposed to serious scalable threats in 
such a realm, it is called for. And so we can add that there is / would often be a very 
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strong ethical case for the PP even were there to be strict probabilities where Cost 
Benefit Analysis (CBA) is technically feasible, in such cases – because it’s just not 
okay to gamble with some kinds of harms. It’s just not OK to put others or all of us at 
risk of serious enough harms. 
 
 
(2)  
In the public sphere, a lack of knowledge/certainty about the climate system is almost 
invariably taken to enjoin inaction. ‘More research is needed’, we are told, until we 
know enough to be ‘entitled’ to act strongly. But this is exactly wrong. Even if the 
climate system were a system that in principle we could hope eventually to attain a 
precise deterministic physical knowledge of xxvi and we were thus regretful of not 
already having such knowledge of it, the lack of such knowledge would not be a good 
reason for inaction. Firstly, for the simple and powerful reason, familiar to us from the 
PP, that we often cannot afford in such cases to wait for such knowledge to be 
attained, because the threat is too pressing. But also, for the following deeper reason: 
The presence of fat tails, of which we lack any precise knowledge, should make us 
more inclined to strong precautious action. Slightly more specifically: Lacking 
deterministic knowledge of climate tipping points, of ‘1 in 1000 year’ floods, let alone 
of ‘1 in 1000000 year’ floods, (and of how what used to be a 1 in a 100 year flood 
may now be more like a 1 in 10 year flood) and so on, makes a precautious approach 
essential. 
 The less deterministic knowledge we have, the more scope there is for the 
worst case scenario to be devastating. Thus my argument here is that (for example) 
even if ‘climate-sceptics’ are right that our climate models are unreliable, they ought 
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(more strongly!) to cleave to the PP, to prevent climate-disaster. For model-
unreliability cuts both ways: it means that things may be much less bad or worse than 
we suppose.xxvii 
 
I strongly applaud the climate-modelers, including my world-renowned colleagues at 
the Tyndall Centre (at UEA), who are seeking to show us all what may happen to our 
planet’s atmosphere/ecosystem if greenhouse gas emissions are unabated. I think it 
especially valuable, in order to concentrate the mind, to have vivid scenarios (and 
here novelists, film-makers etc. may well be as vital as scientists) sketching what a 
climate-chaotic future, likely to be consequent on a business-as-usual greenhouse-gas-
emissions scenario, might look like.xxviii But one of my fundamental points in this 
essay is this: In situations of relatively small upside and open-endedly large downside, 
detailed modelling is not needed. It is desirable, but not non-negotiably essential. The 
decision of what to do (or otherwise) in terms of potentially disturbing our climatic 
system by pumping more and more greenhouse gases into it comes out right simply as 
a ‘decision-theoretic’ one without benefit of the ‘knowledge’ that comes from 
modelling-scenarios. This is really the deep lesson of the Precautionary Principle, the 
way in which it ‘translates’ into real-world action in a way that undermines crude 
assumptions about the alleged need for scientific knowledge. You don’t need to know 
about the future at a level of detail, in terms of what models tell us ‘will’ happen, to 
know what to do (and, just as important, what not to do).xxix Models (in the sense of 
scientific theory about how the climate system works) can obviously help show us 
that the potential downside is large. But if the science indicates that there is a real (not 
merely a ‘logical’) possibility of a very large downside, and if the science itself 
cannot specify it or tell us how large, then the correct thing to do is to invoke the 
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Precautionary Principle and act, rather than to spend millions and millions on building 
ever more complicated computer models that will in any case NEVER BE ABLE TO 
PREDICT THE FUTURE, even if we spent every penny we have on them.xxx 
The reason why climate-modelling has taken up such a prominent place in the 
struggles to save our common future from climatic-devastation is simple to sum up, in 
one word: scientism. It is the belief that without evidence, and without modelling, one 
has nothing. Whereas my argument is that precaution alone is enough to justify strong 
action to prevent the loading up of our atmosphere with unnatural and unprecedented 
levels of (greenhouse) gases. As already stated above, I have of course nothing 
against climate-modelling; it is valuable. Modelling and precaution complement each 
other: but even without reliance on modelling, precautionary reasoning alone would 
do the trick. And it has the advantage of being anti-fragile to ‘climate-scepticism’ and 
climate-denialism: the more uncertain the future, the stronger the precautionary 
argument becomes. xxxi 
 
To sum up this section: that a threat cannot be non-stochastically computed makes 
action to pre-empt it more urgent and important than if it could be. Because, in cases 
where scientific certainty has been attained, then risk can/could be calculated, but 
cases of non-calculable risks are always potentially more-harmful. Thus the 
widespread notion of regret at (e.g.) our lack of ‘complete’ knowledge of the climate, 
and the inference from this that this gives us an excuse for inaction in relation to 
mitigating manmade climate change, is the inverse of the rational and morally 
responsible attitude that should be taken. 
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(3)  
The Precautionary Principle is often criticised as being itself a recipe for inaction, 
when it is ‘thought through’ to its ‘logical conclusion’ xxxii (Some even call it ‘the 
Paralyzing Principle’). For example, it is said that any action at all might carry dire 
risk: thus perhaps it is precautious to stay at home forever, and not take the risk of 
getting knocked down crossing the road outside one’s house. It can easily be seen that 
this is wrong, because of course such a course of action would itself be unprecautious: 
it would expose one to new dire risks (from lack of exercise, from the build-up of 
multiple fragilities in one’s system, etc.). We have to think of precaution in the round: 
we have to think of what is on balance precautious, of what does the opposite of 
‘fragilizing’ us further.  
  Does this mention of ‘on balance’ re-introduce a strictly probabilistic balance 
of risks? Does it re-introduce a space for Cost-Benefit Analysis with regard to big 
decisions, rather than for Precaution? Yes-and-no, and no. ‘Yes’, inasmuch as, very 
very roughly, the risks in such cases as mentioned above are partially calculable. 
Actuarial tables may tell you something about the risk you set yourself up for each 
time you cross the road -- and the risk that you set yourself up for by not 
exercising!xxxiii But ‘no’ too, and (I think) in a deeper sense. It is absurd to think that 
one can make all or even most of one’s decisions in life through calculation (and here 
we return close to the territory of section (1), above, again): These decisions have to 
be made, largely, on the basis of what Wittgenstein called “imponderable 
evidence”,xxxiv on the basis of heuristics, on the basis of values/ethics, and on the basis 
of a rationality that is not comprehensible in the way that Rational Choice Theorists 
xxxv or first-generations Cognitive Scientists such as (famously) Kahnemann and 
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Tversky xxxvi seem to like to think of rationality. (Crucially: when thinking of 
rationality, they typically fail to think seriously of meta-probabilities.) 
 And ‘no’ further, also, in that — crucially — while the argument that one 
should not expose oneself to unnecessary danger by leaving one’s house is 
desperately bad, the argument that we should not collectively expose ourselves to 
unnecessary danger by tampering in a top-down manner in open-systems with 
fundamental biology by means of genetic-engineering technology, or with 
fundamental atmospheric physics by means of geo-engineering technology, for 
instance, is in my view relatively strong.xxxvii Precaution itself militates against the 
former argument, but, on balance, in favour of the latter argument. 
 
 What about the argument that one should stay at home permanently because 
one will then be less liable to be constantly surveilled by police et al watching one 
constantly on CCTV cameras – or by the CIA – or by invisible little men from Mars – 
on the streets outside? In other words: what about the oft-quoted xxxviii worry that the 
Precautionary Principle requires one to guard against a series of more or less paranoid 
or (more generally) mad threats. . . 
The Precautionary Principle is for situations that we may actually encounter. It 
is required for real but non-calculable possibilities of serious harm (and, as mentioned 
earlier, it is relevant for plenty of cases even if and where harms can be calculated but 
should not be gambled with, too). The PP is not required or relevant for situations so 
outlandish or mad that we literally needn’t worry about them at all. Mad threats – the 
threat for instance of the Giant Pumpkin wreaking a terrible revengeful havoc on the 
Earth, for some unknown slight – need not detain us. (For those as yet uncertain of 
this, we will turn to Wittgenstein momentarily, to undergird the thought.) 
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Nor need the alleged concern that there is no criterion to separate mad threats 
from realistic threats detain us. There is no algorithmic criterion, it’s true; it is a 
matter rather of art/judgement. The distinction between mad threats and credible 
threats is too basic/fundamental for there to be any algorithmic criterion. It should 
itself be seen as an instance of the kind of ‘basic knowledge’ that, following 
Wittgenstein, we outlined in section (1), above. (Thus David Runciman’s popular 
rendition of the argument against the Principle, a rendition based on the notion that 
the PP cannot discriminate between mad and non-mad threats, fails.xxxix) 
 
Again, Wittgenstein’s On Certainty can help us to understand the main philosophical 
point that we have been making here in this section. A fundamental principle 
established in that work is this: that doubts not only come to an end somewhere,xl but 
that they require grounds, in the first place.xli And Wittgenstein goes further: compare 
the following important remarks from On Certainty: 
  
“115. If you tried to doubt everything you would not get  
as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself  
presupposes certainty.”   
 
“450. A doubt that doubted everything would not [even] be a doubt.” 
 
If we seek to imagine the Precautionary Principle as applying to every conceivable 
contingency, however outlandish, then we are imagining just such hyperbolic doubt. 
We would then be engaging in a quasi-Cartesian enterprise. Such an enterprise does 
not need engaging in, nor answering. It can simply be ruled out, as not just 
unnecessary, not even just self-defeating, but in fact as merely chronically ill-defined. 
Lacking a determinate sense. 
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Again then: The distinction between mad doubts/threats and credible/doubts 
threats is, following Wittgenstein, too basic for there to be any algorithmic criterion 
for it. 
 Human beings are inclined dangerously to under-prepare for (i.e. we 
inadequately mitigate ahead of time against) dangerous contingencies that can be 
prepared for and mitigated against by a series of precautionary policies and decisions 
that simplify and antifragilise the systems we construct and are part of  (We will 
expand upon this point shortly, in section (4)). Together, we can build down our 
exposure to risk and uncertainty by building down our level of fragility. …But we 
believe this, of course, only for real contingencies. Philosophy, after Wittgenstein 
(and Popper, and Taleb),xlii encourages us to prepare as we can against the 
(catastrophic) ‘black swan’ – not against the Giant Pumpkin. 
 
To sum up this section: Endorsing the Precautionary Principle does not force one to 
have to take action against mad threats. Only an absurd scientistic notion of being 
able to compute all potential threats, and an absurd scientistic notion of our not being 
able to judge the difference between sane and insane concerns, would lead one to 
think that it did.  
With mad threats sidelined, we can focus our attention where sanity demands 
it be focussed. Turning once more to the implications for the case of existential risk 
upon which we have been focussing here, the risks consequent upon messing with our 
climate: We ought to be deeply worried by the unquantifiable risk of ecological 
systems-breakdowns consequent upon unrestrained economic growth terminally 
wrecking our climate system. Weighed in the balance against the comparatively lesser 
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/ trivial harms allegedly caused by loss of economic growth, such uncertainties about 
a possible end to civilisation are overwhelming.xliii 
 
 
(4)  
The logic of my work,xliv allied closely in this regard with that of Taleb, is then that, 
in response to real, un-mad, very serious, incalculable threats, we should adopt a ‘via 
negativa’ approach  (Because any other approach risks creating new ‘Black Swan’ 
threats). We should aim to tamper less and less with (e.g.) the climate system. We 
should build down the level of uncertainty that humans have introduced into that 
system. We should reduce the ignorance manufactured by some of the efforts thus far 
undertaken to (allegedly) stabilise the system.xlv Thus, we should reduce the 
potentially dire threats we have collectively subjected ourselves to by our tampering 
with the climate, and (thus) reduce the likelihood of negative ‘Black Swan’ events. 
(These “should”s are all simultaneously moral and rational. They express the 
responsibility at this time especially of rational, caring beings.) 
 And this leads us to my final substantive point. The Precautionary Principle is 
generally expressed as a substantive principle, as in the version quoted in section (1), 
above. But philosophers in particular might helpfully think of it in the following -- 
second-order xlvi-- form (I am here adapting directly the language of the famous 
quotation with which I began the main body of this paper (in section (1)); the reader 
may wish to look back at that quotation, to compare): 
 
In order to achieve a maximal feasible level of antifragility, policies must be based on 
the meta precautionary principle. Environmental measures must anticipate, prevent 
and attack the causes of situations necessitating us to consider invoking the 
precautionary principle. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, 
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lack of full scientific confidence should not be used as a reason for postponing 
measures to prevent the creation of new situations of threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, and of lack of full scientific confidence. 
 
To be clear: the PP does not imply trying to reduce exposure to all kinds of 
uncertainties — for example, the uncertainties inherent in romantic love are not in the 
least frowned upon by it — but only to uncertainties with a potentially catastrophic 
downside. In the very long run, these are the uncertainties/ignorances/risks that really 
matter; the rest is recoverable from, and may even be beneficial. Much as Taleb 
thinks of it: we love and need uncertainties of other kinds. Depriving anti-fragile 
systems of volatility, randomness and stressors misses a trick, and will tend to harm 
them. In matters of livelihood a peasant- or indigenous- type “safety-first” 
conservatism (venerating Pachamama etc.; minimizing exposure to unlikely or 
unforeseeable events whose consequences could or would be massive and bad) is an 
example the kind of thing that fits well with this meta version of the PP; so long as we 
see too that this kind of conservatism consorts well with a lively and welcoming 
attitude toward exposure to a vast range of other oddball events.  
To sum up this section: the Precautionary Principle, by calling upon us to act 
so as to reduce manufactured, avoidable uncertainty, can then itself be powerfully re-
cast as a ‘second-order Precautionary Principle’: We ought to act so as to reduce our 
future exposure to uncertainty, i.e. To reduce our exposure to situations in which we 
are forced to invoke and apply the Precautionary Principle. The Principle, properly 
applied, will be in the long-term gradually bring itself more and more into abeyance. 
For the more it is applied aright, the less uncertainty bringing in its train serious and 
incalculable threats we will be exposed to. It will probably always be to some extent 
required, because it is actually, in a way, a kind of common-sense, a kind of basic 
(quasi-)knowledge perhaps of the very kind Wittgenstein drew our attention to, in On 
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Certainty. But we might think of it as approaching a limit asymptotically: if we 
manage to become wiser and wiser, and live on a more and more human scale, we 
will be less and less in need of actually applying the (first-order) Precautionary 
Principle to stop something. 
The very radical implications of this include a serious slowing of 
technological ‘progress’. Subjecting such progress to the test of whether it is 
compatible with the greatest confidence of very-long-term safety for human beings 
and the ecosystems on which they (we) utterly depend. This implies that, rather than 
being hoodwinked by promises (even if they (are very likely to) turn out true, reliable) 
of benefits, of sunny uplands, we ought to engage in very long term rigorous closed 
testing of potentially dangerous potentially-‘epidemic’ technologies (e.g. GM) and in 
very slow initially-small-scale-only introduction of ‘non-epidemic’ technologies that 
nevertheless at scale may be very harmful (e.g. new fridge-coolants). We could have 
ended civilisation, had we used bromine rather than CFCs as our fridge-coolant; 
bromine would have blasted the ozone hole way before we had the chance to save 
ourselves.xlvii But only because we allow new technologies substances to be used at 
scale relatively rapidly. A true precautionary approach would not do this. It would 
thus place a constraint on technology (and on capitalism) more significant than any 
we have yet use. If we don’t take this step, then we are gambling with our future: 
risking the whole human future on (e.g.) the desire to be able to spread fridges more 
quickly than we ought (if we were playing safe) to do. 
 
 
(Conclusions) 
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If I have been successful here, then how should one understand what I have 
achieved in the present paper? In this paper, I have sought to show how, far from 
being some recherché piece of philosophy exposed to damning objections, the 
Precautionary Principle should actually be seen as entirely defensible, in part because 
it is a kind of codification of (as we might risk putting it) moral common sense at its 
best. It says that, in the case of serious enough potential threats that are real, that have 
grounds, then one shouldn’t run catastrophic risks. One should search for a way of 
avoiding such risks/threats, without generating others as grave.  
I have, as one might even risk putting it, sought to naturalise the PP. To show 
how it simply falls out of a more general rational and moral attitude, of ‘antifragility’, 
which is enjoined independently of particular perhaps-controversial scientific 
modellings. 
As is, I hope, obvious, one reason for engaging in this exercise is to address 
the extraordinarily widespread mind-set that seeks complete scientific unanimity prior 
to costly action. Speaking for myself, I have a good and increasing degree of 
confidence in the models that show how the danger of greenhouse gas build-ups 
escalate from 2 degrees of over-heating upward, and that how what kind of 
concentrations of GHGs are likely to lead to such over-heat effects. But the reader 
need not share that confidence, in order to be convinced of the same conclusion as I 
have drawn in the present paper: that strong precautionary action, to build down the 
climatic sword of Damocles hanging over us all (and especially, over our children), is 
mandated. That broadening of the appeal of the PP is a key conclusion of the present 
paper. We can and should all act on the climate threat, even if there isn’t even general 
agreement on the science that models our likely climate future(s). For we ought to 
think of dangerous climate change as like a volcano that might well erupt and yet 
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whose eruption we could make less likely by preventing the discharge of a certain 
pollutant. Even if we did not have a clear picture of how likely the eruption was and 
how bad it would be, it would be desperately irresponsible not to warn clearly of the 
possibility of eruption and of the possible extremely harmful effects of the eruption, 
and, more crucially still, not to desist from destabilising the volcano further by 
continuing to pump out the pollutant that we knew to be altering the state more or less 
of balance currently in place in the geophysical system. 
“We need more science” is thus, in the context of the climate threat and threats 
alike to it, a dangerous prevaricating move. One might most usefully see the real 
problems surrounding issues of precautious action and our failure to undertake it as 
questions of will, deep questions of the political will and the ethical integrity to face 
our actual situation and do what is necessary, even if that involves painful changes 
and the giving-up of various things that we have grown used to.xlviii They bring to 
mind Wittgenstein’s desperately-important thought that philosophical problems are, in 
the end, more problems of the will than of the intellect.  
In this paper, I have been clearing the ground for facing up to these things. I 
have, in that sense, been creating the conditions for a more honest and more moral 
conversation about climate, risk, uncertainty, precaution, etc. . 
The Precautionary Principle, as I have shown, applies to all harmful 
eventualities that can come from action (or, similarly, from inactionxlix). It refuses, 
that is, to allow that one must choose between (say) GM crops and ‘conventional’ 
large-scale use of pesticides,l or between dangerous climate change and uncontrolled 
world economic collapse. It insists that one search for solutions that genuinely 
minimise risk and uncertainty, solutions that are genuinely precautious. It requires one 
to forsake courses of action that carry grave avoidable risks of dire consequences, in 
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favour of long-term safer alternatives, even if these are less easy / more awkward, etc. 
. So, for example, world starvation need not follow from the scaling back of pesticide 
use and the scaling back of the massive uncontrolled experiment that is GM crops: if 
older and organic/permacultural/agroforestry/agroecological etc. alternatives are put 
in place. Or if world population is built down in an agreed and non-tyrannical manner 
(a manner that would not itself be likely to spawn violent reactionary revolution / 
more ‘Black Swans’).  
We are not forced to accept the taking of unacceptable risks of one kind or 
another, provided we are willing to think and act outside of the terms of the 
‘dilemmas’ which are standardly set up for us. Truly precautionary principled 
thinking involves looking to build down the level of uncertainty that we are exposed 
to, by searching for genuinely safe(r) alternatives. It looks to reduce the general level 
of risk, uncertainty and ignorance that our extremely fast, unnecessarily complicated, 
and increasingly non-natural (i.e. involving much that is synthetic, artificial, linear, 
and high-entropy) modern mode of living has created. It questions the dogmatic, still-
hegemonic ideology of ‘progress’ that Wittgenstein, famously, questioned. 
 
In this paper, I have tended to focus on the case of dangerous climate change, because 
it is perhaps the most consequential of all species of threat currently facing our 
species. The same or similar logics apply to other similar cases (of which there are 
quite many), as I have at times mentioned above: such as to outdoor growing of GM 
crops, the manmade ozone hole, the fragile banking system, or the energy (in 
particular, the nuclear; plus of course the fossil fuels) industry. (Moreover, additional 
ethical considerations can be argued for, on the basis of such logic(s): I will come to 
these in a moment.li) 
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 Of the number of potential truly global/ecocidal threats that emerge from the 
largely man-made vista of uncertainty and ignorance that I have sketched in this 
section, I’m less bothered than some lii are by the ‘robot apocalypse’ scenario, of 
strong AI taking over and eliminating humanity. This article has concentrated on the 
climate threat and its drivers partly purely for purposes of illustration, but also 
because I believe this to be probably the gravest threat of all that we currently face. 
(Though I’m enough of an advocate of the PP not to gamble too much on that!)  In 
part, because I think it subsumes a number of other threats that I haven’t dwelt on 
here, including that of ‘robot apocalypse’. Precautious action against a potential threat 
is supererogatory if that threat is only feasible in the event of the mobilisation of a 
similarly grave more immediate threat. I think it very likely that we will reach ‘Peak 
Robot’ liii before any plausible risk of robot apocalypse.liv Either through building 
down our impacts as recommended in section (4) above (a building-down which 
would necessarily build down the potential for the existence of very powerful AI 
entities, let alone of channels for them to affect negatively the whole of civilisation) 
— or through civilisational collapse. Civilisational collapse due to climate chaos etc. 
is the likely outcome of a business-as-usual (non-precautionary) way of living in the 
21st century. It would obviously take out robots and AI with it. The key drivers of 
anthropogenic dangerous climate change include the key drivers of any potential 
robot-apocalypse, and of many other imaginative scenarios which creative thinkers 
have come up with for human self-destruction. 
So I think that some high-tech existential risks need not occupy too much of 
our time as philosophers — because the ultra high-tech, high-energy, high-
throughput, high-entropy future they depend upon would in any case drive a 
reasonably rapid climate-apocalypse, to which we may become committed in less 
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now than a generation. (In Hollywood terms: I think we should be more worried about 
The Road, or at best The Hunger Games, as a vision of our future, than about the 
Terminator series…). 
 
 
(Coda) 
 
I hope that my thinking in the present essay has not been too bold. Those in authority 
(political or epistemic) who make unprecautious arguments or ‘forecasts’ should, 
arguably, have ‘skin in the game’;lv they should stand to lose something, in the event 
that they have not taken enough care of those who will listen to them. 
For people RELY on ‘forecasts’. One can only be absolved if one makes 
nuanced and reasonable (not hyperbolic, nor non-existent) assertions of imperfection, 
in respect of one’s claims or concerns (or lack of concerns!) about the future... 
 I will end then by hazarding a remark about the recent controversy about the 
Italian seismologists convicted/imprisoned because they were found (so it has been 
said) to have failed to forecast an earthquake.lvi Many voices in the academic world 
were raised vociferously against this court decision, which was largely overturned on 
appeal (Only one of the seven had his conviction upheld, and his jail term was 
reduced). 
 I am not altogether convinced by the scientists' reaction in this case, and by 
the way that the academic world has virtually without exception rushed indignantly to 
their defence,lvii and has expresssed delight at the overturning of the convictions (of 
six of the seven). I am not in a position to judge the details of the case; I haven’t 
studied it closely enough and am no legal expert. I have no reason, for instance, to 
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doubt that the appeal court’s decision was just. But, whatever the exact rights and 
wrongs of the case, and though it might sound harsh to say so, it seems to me that this 
turn of events in Italy — the fact that this trial happened and that one scientist is even 
in jail because of it — might (even) be salutary. I am no fan of jailing people, and one 
cannot but sympathise with anyone caught harshly in the public eye, and with 
scientists/academics/professionals/officials with difficult jobs trying to do those jobs 
well. But if this Italian case encourages a more genuinely precautionary attitude 
among scientists -lviii e.g. climate scientists - rather than them continuing to rely on 
'models', and simultaneously continuing in most cases not to raise the alarm about the 
way that we may be placing our living world at present very drastically in harm’s 
way, then the cloud that has hung over these seismologists may have a silver lining 
for humanity.  
 For the Italian court’s decision, as I understand it, was not at all that the 
seismologists were imprisoned for failing to predict, to forecast the earthquake. It is 
that they were imprisoned for failing sufficiently to hedge their prediction that there 
was unlikely to be an earthquake (i.e. for overly bold modelling and prediction 
claims), thus (as it turned out) putting citizens at risk, and perhaps also for failing to 
point up the drastic consequences of what would happen if their prediction was wrong 
(i.e. for understating the exposure to harm from such an event, no matter how unlikely 
they deemed it to be). 
 Now: Probably these seismologists were urged not to hedge, just as climate 
scientists are constantly enticed by policymakers to translate uncertainties into 
probabilities. The scientists can and should be blamed for collaborating in their own 
‘corruption’, in such cases; but the problem clearly does not lie only with them. It lies 
at least as much with policy-makers, with the press, and with an entire culture that has 
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not given enough careful thought to how to live with and minimise potentially-
disastrous uncertainties.  
 The present paper is designed to help shift that culture in a different and 
healthier - safer - direction. A Precautionary approach in such cases would be to give 
a full sense of the parameters of uncertainty  (Even a small risk of a fatal seismic 
event is of course enough to justify reasonable precautious action, such as stepping 
outside for a while). And, of course, also, to act so as to reduce the likelihood of 
future catastrophe. (If L’Aquila is to be rebuilt at all, it has to be rebuilt in a radically 
different way, using for instance the kinds of methods that have been tested in 
broadly-similar circumstances in Japan.) 
 We need a culture that is not hooked on the artificial creation of certainties. 
We need to learn better how to live in a world that we will never understand as much 
as scientism fools us into thinking we will. 
 
Strong precautious action is needed to save our species from the all-too-possible 
threat of climate catastrophe. Making this clear is quite simply the most profound 
responsibility facing today’s intellectuals. The form of this needful action should 
largely be a ‘via negativa’:lix not the setting-up of new knowledgeslx and planslxi (that 
only make future ‘Black Swans’ more likely), but the building-down / elimination of 
our tamperings with existing systems (most obviously: the climate system itself) that 
can work, if only we as a species will let them. In other words: we should ‘build 
down’ the climate threat, desist as swiftly as feasible from the actions generating it 
(principally: the production of GHG emissions, but there are of course many other 
such actions which we need to end, such as (crucially) widespread deforestation). 
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 The philosophical upshot is an alternative to epistemic hubris, and thus the 
Precautionary Principle is vindicated by the antifragile thinking implicit at least in 
germ in the work of the likes of Popper and Wittgenstein. Thinking that is clear about 
the constitutive limits of scientific thinking,lxii clear about the need for precaution 
rather than relying on modelling and on the ‘confirmation’ of models, clear that we 
need only be precautious with regard to what we actually have some ground or reason 
to believe is possible in our world, and clear that our ultimate objective – seemingly-
paradoxically, but actually quite-properly -- is to reduce the need for the kind of 
thinking that is here recommended. 
 When the ground is cleared of scientism, then and only then will precaution be 
able to take its rightful place at the very foundation of sane thinking about our 
common future, about technology, and so forth. This shows the stakes of establishing 
the cultural meaning of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, and of allowing that philosophy to 
be received. If Wittgenstein’s philosophy were to be received, inherited, and the tide 
of scientism to turn, if it became possible to see the latter, and for it no longer to be 
merely transparent to us, then at last we would stand a real chance as a species of 
making precaution rather than recklessness into our common sense.lxiii 
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i i.e. Where there is no ‘lid on it. No known (or even knowable) upper bound to it. 
ii On which, cf. Henry Shue’s recent talk, representing his forthcoming work in this 
area: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JHctUFWrqlc  
iii And after all, realistically, in policy-making humans cannot work without there 
being a margin of uncertainty. This has not however, paralysed decision making in 
most areas of policy making. So why must it seemingly impair decision making in 
environmental policy? (Thanks to Vera van Gool for this point.) 
iv In contrast to Daniel Steel’s so-called ‘meta-precautionary-principle’, which is 
really just the Principle itself as a rule about decisions. See p.17f. of his (otherwise-
excellent) book, Philosophy and the precautionary principle (Cambridge: CUP, 2015). 
v On the latter, see Harremoës et al., Late Lessons from Early Warnings: The 
Precautionary Principle 1896-2000, London: Earthscan, 2002. pp.169-70. 
vi Rival candidates for this ‘title’ include liberalism, individualism, managerialism. In 
fact, all these are natural bedfellows for scientism. As outlined in  my work 
elsewhere, especially Wittgenstein among the sciences (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012). 
The Precautionary Principle itself might be viewed as a kind of translation of certain 
‘commons’ norms into the quasi-scientistic “planning” language of industrial 
capitalism – like all translations, this has certain consequences that have to be 
carefully explored. The instinctive attraction that the Principle has for a lot of we 
ecologically-minded people is, I suspect, at bottom an allegiance to a broadly 
commonsian understanding, and is also rooted in an appreciation of the dialectic 
between commons and capital. This is another way of saying that the deeper issues 
that the present essay throws up might ultimately be better pursued not (just) through 
a defence or parsing and re-parsing of the Principle, but through movement-building 
based more explicitly and firmly in the commons politics that underlies our attraction 
to it. I.e., a more historical, anthropological and political as well as philosophical 
approach, informed by understanding the struggles of peasant and indigenous 
societies but also by struggles in industrial societies over the creation of new 
commons, etc. . A place to start in this connection is: to democratise the Precautionary 
Principle. To ensure that it is a matter of and a resource for citizen debate and 
understanding, not merely for elites. That is why I think the thinking of Andy Stirling, 
Brian Wynne etc. on how to find and place Precaution in the agora important. 
vii E.g. in his 'The question concerning technology’ 
http://homes.lmc.gatech.edu/~xinwei/classes/readings/Heidegger/heidegger_techquest
ion2.pdf . 
viii See e.g. my https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hEPcQ6sIOTY . 
ix I challenge the ideology of progress in my “Wittgenstein and the illusion of 
progress”, forthcoming in Philosophy. 
x On which, see my joint article with Nassim Taleb et al, here: 
http://www.fooledbyrandomness.com/pp2.pdf . 
xi Cf. Philosophical Investigations 105. 
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xii Quoted at p.115 of Cameron’s “The precautionary principle in international law”, 
in Tim O’Riordan, James Cameron and Andy Jordan, Re-interpreting the 
precautionary principle (London: Cameron May, 2001). Now, it might immediately 
be objected that this and other classic formulations of the Precautionary Principle (PP) 
don’t prevent use of Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA), so long as the potential loss can be 
in some way computed. But even if this is true, it is very unclear that the loss can 
really be computed in the case in question: Is it anything less than an exercise in 
obscenity and absurdity to seek to put a ‘price’ on the potential end of civilisation, for 
instance? 
xiii See e.g. “The Cost-Benefit Analysis Dilemma: Strategies and Alternatives”, 
Economic and Political Weekly 36:21 (May 26 - Jun. 1, 2001), pp. 1824-1837. 
Some (including e.g. Lord Stern) seem to view the PP and CBA as connected – either 
through thinking of CBA as amendable to be more ‘precautionary’ or (e.g. in the case 
of Dupuy and Grinbaum, see: “Living with uncertainty: from the precautionary 
principle to the methodology of ongoing normative assessment” in Geoscience 337 
(2005)) through thinking of the PP as usable only through using some version of 
CBA. My view, which preserves the distinction between the PP and CBA, is close to 
Stirling’s, 2001, “The Precautionary Principle in Science and Technology,” in 
O’Riordan et al (op.cit.). 
  It might be argued that a Bayesian stance, focussing on ‘subjective probabilities’, 
circumvents the problems with ‘standard’ CBA, in that such a stance is not committed 
to being able to compute numbers to objectively measure risk. But a Bayesian 
approach of course moves further from any direct concern with objective probabilities 
which can output numbers that can then actually represent the real level of a risk. It is 
the absence of the existence of such numbers which lies at the root of my stress on the 
ubiquity of uncertainty (and thus the relevance of the PP).   Moreoever, even in a 
Bayesian approach there is no progress without numbers, without computing results. 
But I am suggesting that the use of numbers to measure risk is itself a founding 
delusion, except where there are objective probabilities (e.g. in a non-crooked 
casino). And that what is needed is a precautionary approach that can work without 
the need to resort to probabilities, no matter of what kind. (The exception is only 
when, as in much of Taleb’s work, ‘probabilities’ are represented only as the logic of 
a situation, not as something to which numbers can literally be ascribed.) 
xiv This can be clearly seen in for instance Stephen Gardiner’s influential piece, “A 
core precautionary principle” in Journal of Political Philosophy 14 (1): 33–60 (2006). 
Gardiner means to be defending the Principle against widespread criticisms that other 
philosophers have made, but, by my lights in the present piece, some of the 
concessions he makes amount to an attack on the Principle. 
xv For discussion, see e.g. p.78 of the 3rd edition of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions. 
xvi Even leaving aside here the valid point, implicit in my Wittgenstein among the 
sciences, that even the idea of natural science as a unitary phenomenon is itself 
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questionable. (For the most compelling argument to that conclusion, see “The 
Disunity of Science”, John Dupré Mind New Series, Vol. 92, No. 367 (Jul., 1983), pp. 
321-346.) 
xvii See especially my There is no such thing as a social science (co-authored with 
Phil Hutchinson and Wes Sharrock; Farnham: Ashgate, 2012) and Wittgenstein 
among the sciences (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012). See also Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s 
Antifragile (London: Penguin; 2012), 
http://www.fooledbyrandomness.com/pinker.pdf and The Black Swan (New York: 
Random House, 2nd ed: 2010), works which have been a huge influence on the present 
paper. 
xviii And ‘Grey Swan’ – see below. 
xix Though that may turn out not to be the most helpful word in relation to what is 
under discussion here. As Wittgenstein discusses at some length, the very status and 
nature of such “knowledge” is itself at issue. 
xx Wittgenstein, On Certainty (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969; henceforth OC) section 675; 
emphasis in the original. Wittgenstein is of course explicitly contesting here the 
legacy of Descartes, the founder of modern Western philosophy, who sought to 
suggest that everything could potentially be doubted. 
xxi See e.g. OC 71. 
xxii A similar argument in the phenomenological tradition can be found in the early 
chapters of Michel Henry’s Barbarism (London: Continuum, 2012).  
xxiii Which cannot, however, contra Moore and Descartes alike, be used as a 
foundation to build an epistemological edifice on. 
xxiv It might seem that this is not so. It might seem that the question “What will the 
climate be like in X years time if we emit Y quantity of GHGs” has a definite answer, 
regardless of human action. But this isn’t the case. For the question can at best be 
answered on a ceteris paribus basis. But ceteris never is paribus, when human beings 
are to some extent or another aware of what is happening or reacting to it. For 
example, the climate, even at a given level of GHGs, will be radically different if we 
geoengineer; or if we cut down the Amazon rainforest; or if we restore it. 
There is moreover a whole literature discussing the “climate determinism” that is 
today in some senses furthered and elaborated by GCM methodology; see for instance 
Mike Hulme’s work. 
xxv We do not of course mean to imply that there is any conflict between science and 
the PP. Far from it. Indeed, Stirling (op.cit.) claims that the PP is more scientifically 
appropriate than “narrow risk” approaches (by which he means CBA), because it 
more genuinely reflects the complexities of uncertainty.  
xxvi One reason why it isn’t, is given in section (1), above; another reason, which we 
shall not press here, is the broadly Mandelbrotian nature of the climate system even 
considered as a physical system. (Furthermore: even deterministic systems are not 
necessarily predictable beyond a rudimentary, short-term level.) 
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xxvii This only fails to follow if the model is total rubbish: e.g. if one has no good 
reason to believe in the greenhouse effect at all. But few ‘climate-sceptics’ are as bold 
as to be physics-deniers, thus rendered unable to explain why (for instance) the 
Earth’s surface is warmer than the Moon’s… 
xxviii It is perhaps worth noting here the irony that there is a problem inherent in 
efficaciously using precautionary action: the problem of not being able to show that it 
has worked (even if – or rather, especially if - it in fact has done so). For, when it 
works, we can’t of course show people the counter-factual. That is to say that, sadly, 
we can only see just how badly we need to act precautiously by observing what 
happens in cases where, sadly, we don’t/didn’t. 
xxix At most, you need to know that the kinds of harms you want to prevent are worse 
than the kinds of harms you might risk from taking ‘action’/inaction... 
xxx Add to this the ultimately spurious nature of the techniques used to estimate 
probabilities of outcomes in such models: spurious, most centrally for the kinds of 
reasons given in (1) (i) above. 
xxxi See http://www.blackswanreport.com/blog/2015/05/our-statement-on-climate-
models/ & also http://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-per-
cent/2014/apr/04/climate-change-uncertainty-stronger-tackling-case . 
xxxii For detail and discussion, see Chapter 2, section 3.4 (ii) of Ruth Makoff’s 2011 
UEA Ph.D thesis, “Ethical criteria to guide an international agreement on climate 
change”. 
xxxiii And there are of course many globally ‘non-scalable’ cases where a rough-and-
ready ‘balance of probabilities’ approach can be fairly harmlessly taken: e.g. The 
decision, as a woman over 40, of whether or not to have regular mammograms. As 
explicated by Taleb in the opening pages of Chapter 22 of Antifragile, it is by no 
means clear that such a calculation suggests that the rational thing to do, given the 
evidence, is to have regular mammograms  (I also note however that there are 
elements of this case too that are in any case not amenable to rational calculation: 
such as the question of being nagged by doubts in relation to a decision which might 
have serious consequences for one’s body-image, physical attractiveness, etc). To 
generalise: Randomised Controlled Trials and the like give one useful evidentiary 
basis for making decisions in situations which, while not strictly calculable as odds in 
a casino are, can nevertheless generally be roughly calculated. Such are not however 
‘fat-tail’ cases; they are not the kinds of cases most commonly encountered in the 
social/economic sciences (that we explored in section (1), above), and often, 
similarly, in the environmental sciences. 
xxxiv See his beautiful discussion at p.228 of section xi of ‘Part II’ of Philosophical 
Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997 (1953)). 
xxxv Consider here for example the way in which the uber-Rational-Choice-Theorist 
Jon Elster gradually came to realise that for many decisions it is / would be irrational 
to make them by means of the canons of Rational Choice Theory. 
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xxxvi Compare here Lakoff and Johnson’s critique (e.g. in Philosophy in the flesh 
(New York: Basic, 1999)) of Hahnemann & Tversky et al: Tversky is not (as he 
thinks he is) showing us that we are all almost constantly more or less irrational; he is 
only ‘showing’ us that our idea of rationality as calculative, explicit, conscious, etc. is 
a prejudice that we need to overcome. And that our/his/that narrow idea of rationality 
does not properly encompass the way in which common-sense reasoning often 
implicitly includes an intelligent concern with meta-probabilities: that is, with reasons 
for being concerned about uncertainties present or inherent in calculations of risk. (He 
is also sometimes ‘showing’ us examples of inadvertently poor experimental design 
on his part…) 
xxxvii On this, see especially http://arxiv.org/abs/1410.5787  
xxxviii See e.g. David Runciman’s London Review of Books piece: 
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n07/david-runciman/the-precautionary-principle . See also 
for discussion Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History 
and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 
Volume 34, Issue 2, June 2003, Pages 329–344; “Is the precautionary 
principle unscientific?”, by David B. Resnik. 
xxxix See again http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n07/david-runciman/the-precautionary-
principle . Runciman’s approach is I think derived from that of Sunstein. Sunstein’s 
book and approach is highly problematic, but it does have one positive virtue: it 
allows some space for an ‘anti-catastrophe principle’, which is thus evidently not a 
million miles away from my interpretation of the PP. Runciman would have done 
well to have learnt from this moment in Sunstein’s book. 
xl See OC 110, 130 & 204. 
xli See OC 4, 516, 122. 
xlii Here I am thinking especially, as is I trust obvious, of Taleb’s important broadly 
Popperian work of contemporary public philosophy, The Bblack Swan. 
xliii For amplification, see Larry Lohmann’s impressive arguments against cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA) and for precaution, at thecornerhouse.org.uk ; and compare Cranor’s 
paper (Carl Cranor, “Toward understanding aspects of the precautionary principle” 
(Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 29:3 (2004), pp.259-279)), which (at pp.267-
272) rebuts the alleged advantage of CBA over precaution that the former is 
supposedly more normatively ‘neutral’. 
xliv For broader background to and other exemplifications of this logic, see e.g. 
Taleb’s (op.cit.); see also my 
www.greenhousethinktank.org/files/greenhouse/home/Guardians_inside_final.pdf and 
my “On future people”, in THINK!: Volume 10 / Issue 29; September 2011, pp 43 - 
47. GIVE REF. . Cf. also Larry Lohman’s work. 
xlv I have in mind here especially Lohman’s superb ‘epistemological’ critique of the 
Kyoto Protocol, e.g. here: 
www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/sites/thecornerhouse.org.uk/files/IgnoranceFinal.pdf  
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xlvi Perhaps it shouldn’t surprise one that the Precautionary Principle, when 
understood aright, takes on a ‘second-order form’: I.e. that it requires acting so as to 
avoid future needs to invoke the precautionary principle. For the PP clearly requires 
and is an instance of “second-order” learning: learning about learning. Roughly: It 
concerns and offers a wiser way of applying our learning from -- and acting 
appropriately in light of -- our ignorance.  
xlvii See the closing paragraphs of https://newrepublic.com/article/74544/planet-doom 
for reference to this little-known fact, which James Hansen, the great NASA climate 
scientist, laid out. 
xlviii These problems of course extend then to the problems of asymmetric effects (the 
‘sacrifices’ needed to prevent the likelihood of runaway climate change come mainly 
now, the benefits come mainly much later), of the tragedy of open-access (the 
‘sacrifices’ needed benefit the sacrificer themselves only very marginally, in material 
terms, thus leading to a potent ‘free-rider’ problem), of despair at what to do in light 
of dysfunctional political systems and systems of international governance, etc. . In 
relation to the last point: there is little basis for precautious action if one has no 
confidence that the threat facing us is one we can possible succeed in fighting. If the 
Earth were to be faced with the possible sudden coming of an asteroid storm that, if it 
came, would be so vast as to be clearly beyond human powers to resist, then the PP 
would not apply. But of course to think that manmade climate change is like that is 
surely itself to slip into the mode of thinking I opposed in (1) (i), above: it is to slip 
into a fatalism that is inappropriate, with regard to human action, where, as 
philosophers from Pascal to James have brought us to understand, the great danger of 
a belief that we cannot succeed in addressing a grave threat is not that the belief is 
true, but that the belief is self-fulfilling. 
xlix Though it tends to recommend, as we might put it, a more generalised inaction, in 
the sense that it cautions in general against actions that introduce new fragilities – see 
section (4), above. 
l For both of these are dangerously monocultural, fragile, potentially leading to long-
term disaster. 
li See e.g. Book VII of Taleb’s Antifragile, “The ethics of fragility and antifragility”. 
lii Notably, Nick Bostrom and the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford. 
liii See my article thereon, here: 
http://www.greenhousethinktank.org/uploads/4/8/3/2/48324387/response_to_pearmai
n.pdf . 
liv One reason I think this is that I think, for Wittgensteinian (and phenomenological) 
reasons, that it is going to turn out to be far more difficult than is generally currently 
supposed to create any strong AI. I suspect that strong AI — actual intelligence, 
rather than focussed, powerful simulacra thereof) — will not be feasible without 
creating robots (creatures with bodies, not just very powerful computers) that actually 
‘live’ and learn in an open-ended way, over long periods - very roughly as infants do. 
I think that Wittgenstein, Lakoff and Johnston, and Merleau-Ponty have suggested 
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good reasons for doubting that a being without motor functions, and without sociality, 
would actually be… a being. Thus I think that strong AI (let alone a strong AI that 
would be anti-fragile to human efforts to damage it) is probably still a very long way 
off. For such beings will not only require a long time to ‘grow’, but remain different 
from what in most cases is the focus of AI ‘research’ and development. (To take this 
discussion further would require a further paper, so I must leave it there.) 
lv For explication and argument, see again Book VII of Taleb’s Antifragile. In future 
work, I hope to develop thinking further on what would be some of the institutional, 
cultural implications and innovations of and in a society that really took this point on 
board. 
lvi See e.g. http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/1275309--earthquake-experts-
get-six-years-in-jail-for-failing-to-warn-people-in-italian-town & 
http://news.sciencemag.org/earth/2014/11/updated-appeals-court-overturns-
manslaughter-convictions-six-earthquake-scientists . 
lvii There's a reasonably nuanced account of the situation here, in Nature: 
http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110914/full/477264a.html . 
lviii There is a danger, of course, that it will simply encourage litigiousness, and (on 
the part of scientists) fear and reluctance to speak out at all. (Cf. 
http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110914/full/477251a.html?WT.ec_id=NATURE-
2011095 .)  But there is a balance to be sought here. A balance to be sought, between 
that unhappy outcome on the one hand, and a complete lack of ‘skin in the game’ 
among scientists on the other. My point is this: that, when/where the pronouncements 
of scientists are connected to exposure to risk among the public, then it is vital that a 
properly precautionary attitude be taken. If it requires the risk of the odd person being 
taken to court to encourage the taking up of that attitude, then so be it. 
lix See http://www.blackswanreport.com/blog/2015/05/our-statement-on-climate-
models/ for explication in exactly the present context. 
lx See again Lohman’s arguments, op.cit. 
lxi Compare here John Gray’s (also Karl Polanyi’s) sense of laissez-faire as itself 
being a plan, programmatic, rather than the absence of one that it pretends to be in the 
hands of (say) Hayek. See the Introduction to Gray’s Beyond the new Right (London: 
Routledge, 1993) (and Polanyi’s The Great Transformation (London: Beacon, 2002 
(1944)) (passim)). 
lxii While of course acknowledging that science is itself necessary for helping to reveal 
to us the limits of scientific thinking, of what it is that scientists as scientists can 
enable us to know. For the limits of such thinking are to a large extent found ‘from 
the inside’. Only: I would emphasise nevertheless that science is not sufficient for 
revealing all of those limits, and that it is ethically irresponsible (and politically naive)  
to place on scientists the sole burden of establishing the attitude that ought to be taken 
to the kinds of threats with which this article has been concerned. For that burden, the 
burden of not gambling with our common future, falls on us all, and requires a 
mobilisation of values that far exceed the role of the scientist qua scientist. 
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lxiii Many thanks to Jenni Barclay, Vera van Gool, Nick Cameron, Alex Haxeltine, 
Vlad Vexler, Angus Ross, Larry Lohman and Ruth Makoff for extremely helpful 
comments on earlier drafts of this paper. And deep thanks to audiences of the Future 
of Humanity Insititute (Oxford) and elsewhere, whose thoughts on this material have 
been invaluable. Thanks also to Tess Read. Thanks above all to Larry Lohmann and 
Nassim Taleb, whose work has directly led to and further stimulated key insights in 
this paper. 
